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Job polarization has squeezed the American middle class.
Has the decline in manufacturing and clerical jobs been responsible for the lagging wages of
middleskill workers in the United States? To answer this question, Michael Boehm compares the
occupational choices and earnings of survey respondents in the 1980s and today.
The decline of the middle class has been much debated in the United States and elsewhere in
recent years. The first important component of this decline is the fall in the number of well-paid
middle-skill jobs in manufacturing and clerical occupations since the 1980s. Figure 1 depicts this
phenomenon of ‘job polarisation’.
Figure 1: Changes in US employment shares by occupations since the end of the 1980s 
Notes: The chart depicts the percentage point change in employment in the low-, middle-
and high-skilled occupations in the NLSY and the comparable years and age group in the
more standard CPS. The high-skill occupations comprise managerial, professional services
and technical occupations. The middle-skill occupations comprise sales,
office/administrative, production, and operator and labourer occupations. The low-skill
occupations include protective, food, cleaning and personal service occupations.
The second important component is the drop in relative earnings for workers around the median of the wage
distribution over the same period. This is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Percentage growth of the quantiles of the US wage distribution since the end of the 1980s
Notes: The chart depicts the change in log real wages along the quantiles of the wage
distribution between the two cohorts for the NLSY and the comparable years and age group
in the CPS.
Economic research, much of it conducted at CEP, has illuminated the first component of the decline in middle-skill
jobs. It has done this by relating job polarisation to rapid changes in information and communication technologies,
which have made it possible for machines to take on the routine tasks previously done by workers in middle-skill
jobs.
To date, the second component of the decline of the middle class – lagging wages – has not had as much
academic scrutiny. In particular, there have been no studies that closely link the stagnant earnings for workers
around the median of the wage distribution to the decline in middle-skill jobs. My research addresses this issue by
asking three interrelated questions:
First, have the relative wages of workers in middle-skill occupations declined as predicted by the
mechanisation of routine tasks explanation for job polarisation?
Second, have the relative wage rates paid per ‘constant unit of skill’ in the middle-skill occupations dropped
with polarisation?
And third, can job polarisation explain the changes in the overall wage distribution?
I answer these questions by analyzing two waves of a representative survey of young workers in the United
States carried out in 1979 and 1997. The survey responses provide detailed and multidimensional characteristics
of these young people that influence their occupational choices and wages.
Using these characteristics, I compute the probabilities of workers in the 1980s and today choosing middle-skill
occupations and then compare the wages associated with these probabilities over time. My empirical strategy
relies on predicting the occupations that today’s workers would have chosen had they lived in the 1980s and then
comparing their wages to those of workers who actually chose those occupations at that time.
The results from this approach show a substantial negative effect of job polarisation on middle-skill workers. The
positive wage effect associated with a 1% higher probability of working in high-skill jobs compared with middle-
skill jobs almost doubles from 0.31% to 0.60% between the 1980s and today. And the negative wage effect
associated with a
1% higher probability of working in low-skill services jobs compared with middle-skill jobs attenuates from -1.65%
to -0.95% over the same period. I find similar results when controlling for college education, which is arguably a
measure of absolute skill. This suggests that it is indeed the relative advantage in the middle-skill occupations for
which the returns in the labour market have declined.
In the next step of my analysis, I estimate the changes in relative market wage rates that are offered for a
‘constant unit of skill’ in each of the three occupational groups. We can think of wage rates paid per constant unit of
skill as the hypothetical change in wages had the workers in the middle-skill occupations stayed the same across
the two survey waves. To do this, I use a standard economic model of occupational choice. This predicts a tight
relationship between workers’ occupational choices and their earnings and market wage rates across the two
survey waves, which I use to estimate the wage rates. 
Again, the position of the middle-skill occupations deteriorates substantially: the wage rates paid in the high-skill
occupations increased by 20% compared with the middle while the wage rate in the low-skill occupations rose by
30%. This decline in the relative attractiveness of working in the middle-skill occupations is of course in line with
the massive outflow of workers from these jobs.
Finally, I check what effect changing prices of labour may have had on the overall wage distribution. Figure 3
shows that the change in the wage distribution due to these price effects reproduces the overall distribution
reasonably well in the upper half while it fails to match the increase of wages for the lowest earners compared with
middle earners.
Figure 3: Actual and counterfactual changes in the US wage distribution  
Notes: The chart plots the actual and counterfactual changes in the wage distribution in the
NLSY when workers in the 1980s are assigned the estimated price changes in their
occupations.
At first glance, this is surprising given the strong increase in relative wage rates for low-skill work and the increase
in the wages of workers in low-skill occupations. The reason is that these workers now move up in the wage
distribution, which lifts not only the (low) quantiles where they started out but also the (middle) quantiles where
they end up. The inverse happens for workers in middle-skill occupations but with the same effect on the wage
distribution.
But these are only price effects and there may be additional wage effects from workers moving out of the middle-
skill occupations into high- and low-skill occupations that I cannot definitively quantify in this study. Moreover,
other researchers have suggested that the substantial increase in wages at the bottom of the wage distribution
(which is unique to the United States while job polarisation is also happening elsewhere) may be partly due to
policy-related changes, such as the minimum wage and de-unionisation. So the results for the lower part of the
wage distribution remain somewhat inconclusive.
Overall, my research confirms that job polarisation has had strong effects on workers’ relative wages. While further
studies need to examine more closely the ambiguous results for the lower part of the wage distribution, we can
already predict that ever expanding improvements in technology are a force that not only displaces workers
further up and down the skill distribution but also leads to substantially declining wages for these individuals.
But as Alan Manning points out in another article in the most recent issue of CentrePiece, this need not
necessarily be the case. If governments and individuals make the right counteracting investments in education
and training to improve the supply of skills (especially for the least skilled people), job polarisation may not have
overly adverse consequences on inequality in the future.
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